Via the link in that Wiki article, here's "The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 2: 1977".
https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazona ... 2-1977.pdf
The phrase "new physical principles" does not appear, but "new weapons of mass destruction" does. Chapter XIII lays out the background of the UN discussion:
The international community has long been aware that military research may result in new devices whose destructive effect is comparable to that of nuclear weapons. As early as 1948, when atomic weapons had been in existence for only a few years, the Commission for Conventional Armaments of the Security Council adopted a resolution which reflected the realization that in the future weapons might be developed with characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, and lethal biological and chemical weapons.
The General Assembly took up the discussion of the question of new weapons of mass destruction in 1969 on the initiative of Malta. It did so by adopting resolutions 2602 C (XXIV) and 2602 D (XXIV), relating respectively to radiological methods of warfare and military applications of laser technology. In the following year, the subject was briefly discussed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which, however, did not deal with it in depth.
The question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was. first included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, in 1975, following the transmission by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, of a letter to the Secretary-General,^ to which a draft international agreement on the question was attached. That agreement did not contain a definition of the new types of weapons or the new systems to be included in the prohibition, but indicated in article I that they would be specified through negotiations. Article I also provided that new areas of development emerging after the entry into force of the agreement would be the subject of negotiations to extend the prohibition. The General Assembly subsequently adopted resolution 3479 (XXX), in which it asked the CCD to proceed on the matter.
In 1976, the CCD accordingly considered the question and held two series of informal meetings on it, in April and August of that year.^ In the discussion, the USSR and the other Eastern European countries advanced the view that it was essential to adopt a general prohibition of the development of new types and systems of mass destruction immedi ately, since it was more difficult to eliminate weapons once they were deployed than to ban their development and manufacture while they were still at the stage of research or experiment. A number of Western States, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that new scientific developments should be dealt with as they arose and that some potential new weapons of mass destruction fell within categories of weapons that already existed and should be covered in the context of such weapons. The difference in approach was thus basically one of definition.
This was also the case during the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session in 1976. During that session, Western States again sought clarification in respect of the question of the definition of the weapons to be covered in the draft treaty submitted by the USSR. The Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned States stressed the importance of banning new weapons of mass destruction in general and called for negotiations on a treaty to this end. The Soviet Union stated that it was ready to propose an approach that would include among new types of weapons of mass destruction any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action, according to the method of use, the target to be attacked, and the nature of their impact.
The Assembly once more adopted a resolution on the subject, resolution 31/74, in which it called upon the CCD to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.
During the 1977 session, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament gave considerable attention to the subject.'* Its discussions centred
at first on the draft convention submitted to it by the Soviet Union the year before^ and subsequently on the revised version of the draft, which
its sponsor presented on 9 August 1977 (see appendix X below). Animportant point in the discussions was that of the priority to be given to the matter. Most of the delegations supporting the Soviet draft stressed the need for early agreement. Several other delegations, how ever, expressed the view that the negotiation of such an agreement should not divert the attention of the Committee from its task of adopting measures relating to already existing weapons, particularly nuclear ones. That point was made by the delegations of Egypt, Italy, theNetherlands, Romania and others.
As in the previous discussions, salient issues were the scope of a convention on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and the definition of such weapons, the verification aspect of such a convention and the question of how to avoid hampering technological and scientific research for peaceful purposes.
Generally, in the first phase of the debate in the CCD, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States renewed their call for early agreement on a general prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and the Western States, while supporting efforts to ban particular weapons of mass destruction, objected to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning any future, unspecified, new weapons of this kind.
The delegation of the United Kingdom believed that a single treaty banning the development of new weapons of mass destruction would have to be so general in scope and so vague in its definitions that it would not be effective. It proposed that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution firmly condemning the development of such weapons, together with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review. The CCD might then decide to negotiate specific agreements from time to time to preclude the development of particular new types of weapons of mass destruction which were based on new applications of scientific principles.
Canada, Italy, Sweden and the United States made statements supporting that suggestion. The Canadian delegation said, inter alia, that the discussion of the Soviet proposal had failed to show that weapons based on applications of new principles of science threatened to appear in the foreseeable future. Canada held that an “umbrella” agreement would not be of practical value, since each type of weapon had its own characteristics and problems, and it supported the “common-sense approach” of the United Kingdom.
The submission by the Soviet Union, on 9 August 1977, of a revised version of its draft treaty initiated the second phase of the debate.
In its statement, the Soviet Union explained that the new draft, in deference to the wishes of a number of members of the CCD, was using the 1948 formulation of the Commission for Conventional Armaments as the basis for the definition in article I, stating it in greater detail in the light of present requirements and tasks in the field of disarmament. That was necessary because the definition in the 1948 formulation did not, in the view of the delegation, make the necessary distinction between known types of weapons of mass destruction, including those that had been modernized, and new types of weapons which might be developed. The new draft article also took account of the possibility that weapons would be developed which
were even more effective than existing ones, not only from the point of view of destruction, but from that of their damaging effect on human beings.
The revised draft agreement also included a clause providing that, parallel to a general agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, special agreements could be concluded on the prohibition of particular types of weapons of mass destruction. The draft further foresaw that a specific list of types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and that that list could be supplemented if new areas of development and manufacture of such weapons emerged after the agreement had entered into force. The list annexed to the draft included the following types and systems of weapons: (a) radiological means of the non-explosive type acting with the aid of radioactive materials; (b) technical means of inflicting radiation injury based on the use of charged or neutral particles to affect biological targets; (c) infrasonic means using acoustic radiation to affect biological targets; and (d) means using electromagnetic radiation to affect biological targets.
The Soviet delegation stated that in the opinion of specialists, there existed a sufficient material basis for the application in practice of the
scientific and technological principles that could be useful in the development of the new types of weapons of mass destruction included in that annex.
A different point of view was held by the United States, which considered that the best way to prevent the development and deployment of new types of weapons of mass destruction would be to keep the question under review, developing specific agreements dealing with particular new types of such weapons when they had been clearly identified. That would permit the formulation of verification measures specifically tailored to the weapons in question. The United States delegation doubted that attempts to reach such specific agreements would be helped by linking them to an over-all treaty dealing with technological fields not clearly understood or with areas of scientific development on whose military potential there was no general agreement. The delegation shared the objective of curbing weapons of mass destruction, but considered the 1948 definition adequate and saw no
justification for amending it on grounds of new technological developments, since no such developments existed.
The discussion at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, where the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons figured as item 46 on the agenda, reflected the same trends and centred around the same main issues as in the CCD.
Emphasizing the urgency and importance of the issue, the USSR called upon the United Nations to demand resolutely that plans for production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the so-called neutron bomb, should be discontinued. Noting the positive results in the study of the substantive aspects of the problem by the CCD during the last year, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its belief in the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement as the most effective way of eliminating the danger of developing new types of weapons of mass destruction and called on the General Assembly to urge the reactivation of the talks on the subject.
Canada found that some elements of obscurity in the original Soviet draft had been somewhat diminished. It nevertheless held that there were serious practical difficulties in the way of making the Soviet proposal effective as an arms control treaty. A similar statement was also made by the Federal Republic of Germany. Among other Western States that expressed views on the matter were Belgium, Japan, Portugal and the United States
The United Kingdom noted that the discussion of this subject in the CCD had led it and many others to the conclusion that there was no immediate danger that any new weapons of mass destruction based on any identified new scientific principle would emerge in the near future.
It did agree, however, that it was necessary to ensure that no new scientific discovery would be used for the creation of weapons of mass destruction coming under the fourth category of the 1948 definition, i.e. “weapons which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above”. The United Kingdom had studied with great care and sympathy the Soviet Union’s proposal to achieve that objective in a single all-embracing treaty, but it still remained convinced that such a treaty would inevitably be so vague and so general in its provisions as to be ineffective.
So in the clear text of the discussions, one of the issues driving this deep fear by the Soviets was the development of the neutron bomb. It's hard however to see why the neutron bomb would be considered either "new physical principle" or something different from atomic weapons, since it is just a radiological weapon and actually is an atomic weapon.
In the background of the discussion, is the strong suggestion of something unspoken.. something that could not be named in public discussion. The American and British reluctance to agree on a general agreement, and a desire for specific (probably secret) treaties, makes me think that these two nations were specifically doing research along some non-atomic line that they did not want to either stop or publically announce.
Perhaps I'm reading too much in from elsewhere, because obviously I want there to have been such research.... but the Soviet interest particularly in banning "Means using electromagnetic radiation to affect biological targets" makes me think of the US military interest in Soviet "Psychotronics" which emerged around 1969, just about the same time as Andrei Gromyko announced his ban proposal.
See eg Ostrander and Schroeder's "Psychic Discoveries Behind The Iron Curtain" (
https://archive.org/details/psychicdisc ... 1/mode/2up ), which led to the creation of both Mankind Resources Unlimited and the US Psychotronics Association.
Then, in the Putin era, we see the first announcements of a reversal: Russia officially declaring that it is resuming work on "new physical principles" weapons. I thought 2016 was the beginning of this policy, but in fact it goes back to 2000!
Here's Arms Control Today, the official publication of the NGO "Arms Control Association", May 2000:
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-05 ... y-doctrine
On April 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine intended to replace the doctrine issued in 1993 and to elaborate on the military policies outlined in the new Russian national security concept, released in January. (See ACT, January/February 2000.) The doctrine, which Russia says is "defensive in nature," states that it is designed for the current "transitional period" in both Russian politics and international relations.
The new military doctrine addresses a broad range of topics, including the nature and causes of modern wars, the internal and external military threats facing Russia, the organization and funding of the Russian military, and the principles governing Russia's use of force. It also addresses a variety of specific, militarily relevant issues in the technical, political, social, and economic spheres, including the implementation of arms control treaties, the threat posed by "illegal armed formations" within Russia, and the effective imposition of international sanctions.
In keeping with the security concept it is intended to complement, the new doctrine appears to lower the threshold for Russia's use of nuclear weapons below what was stated in the national security concept that was issued in 1997. Whereas the 1997 concept allowed the first use of nuclear arms only "in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation," the new doctrine allows nuclear weapons use "in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation." It also explicitly states for the first time that Russia "reserves the right" to use nuclear weapons to respond to all "weapons of mass destruction" attacks. Furthermore, the doctrine reaffirms Russia's negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states and reiterates Russia's extension of its nuclear umbrella to its allies. (See section I [8].)
The following is the full text of the doctrine, originally published in Russian in the April 22 issue of Nezavisimaya Gazeta and translated by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Readers should note that the words and phrases enclosed in parentheses are part of the original text, while those in brackets are clarifications inserted by FBIS.
3. The main general features of modern war are:
• its impact on all spheres of human activity;
• its coalition nature;
• the extensive use of indirect, non-close-quarter, and other (including nontraditional) forms and means of operation, and long-range effective engagement and electronic engagement [dalnego ognevogo i elektronnogo porazheniya];
• a desire on the part of the sides to disrupt the system of state and military command and control;
• the use of highly efficient state-of-the-art systems of arms and military hardware (including those based on new physical principles);
Bolding is mine. So that Russian phrase "new physical principles" appears in 2000.
In 2012, Foreign Policy magazine reported Putin's remarks during his first reelection campaign:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/27/ge ... s-you-say/
David Hoffman
Genetic weapons, you say?
March 27, 2012, 12:59 PM
In the Russian government lately, there’s been some careless talk about biological weapons.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published a series of essays about the country’s problems as part of his bid to return to the presidency. The essay on national security, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta on Feb. 20, argued that Russia needs to prepare for threats of the future.
"The military capability of a country in space or information countermeasures, especially in cyberspace, will play a great, if not decisive, role in determining the nature of an armed conflict," Putin wrote.
Then he added:
"In the more distant future, weapons systems based on new principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will, in addition to nuclear weapons, provide entirely new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals."
Putin said Russian needed to be prepared "for quick and effective responses to new challenges."
Putin seemed to be making the general point that weapons which are based on genetically-engineered pathogens — biological weapons — could be a future threat. Many others have expressed fears about this as well.
Then, last Thursday, Putin gathered some of his leading cabinet ministers to talk about implementing the ideas in his essays. The Russian government has published a transcript of the session. Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov pledged to come up with a plan to implement 28 tasks set by Putin. Among them, he said:
"The development of weapons based on new physical principles: radiation, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical, etc."
Putin did not react, but he should have stopped this loose talk. "Genetic" weapons — and more broadly, all biological weapons — are banned by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Russia has insisted that it is in compliance and is not working on biological weapons of any kind. (The Soviet Union, in earlier decades, built a massive biological weapons program in violation of the treaty, which it had signed.)
Last December, at the Seventh Review Conference of the treaty in Geneva, the Russian Federation vowed that it "fully and unwaveringly carries out its obligations" and "does not develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain" biological or toxin weapons.
Perhaps someone needs to remind the defense minister and the re-elected president.
NBC News picked up the "psychophysical" hint:
https://www.nbcnews.com/science/cosmic- ... flna677150
Reality check on Russia's 'zombie ray gun' program
April 7, 2012, 12:24 PM GMT+12
By Alan Boyle, Science Editor, NBC News
Are we on the brink of an arms race over zombie ray guns? You might think so, based on the alarms being rung over Russia's potential to create mind-scrambling weapons. But the reality is that it'll be a long time before we have to worry about super-soldiers taking over our brains.
The Americans as well as the Russians have been looking into psychotronic weapons for more than 15 years. You can find ample references to the subject on the Internet, including a feature published by U.S. News and World Report in 1997 and a report written for a U.S. Army publication in 1998.
Such weapons purport to take advantage of the effect that pulsed microwaves can have on brain activity. Some researchers have reported an effect known as microwave hearing, in which a directed beam of radiation produces a sensation of buzzing, clicking or hissing in the head. "This technology in its crudest form could be used to distract individuals," according to a declassified Army review of non-lethal weapons.
Theoretically, electromagnetic beams could cause an epileptic-type seizure, or involuntary eye motion leading to dizziness and nausea. Military researchers have also looked into using infrasound or laser beams to confuse or incapacitate a foe — but when you start going down this road, before you know it, you're talking about remote viewing, ESP and all the way-out concepts chronicled in "The Men Who Stare at Goats."
The Russian connection
The Russians have looked into these potential technologies at least as deeply as the Pentagon has, and you're hearing about zombie ray guns now because top Russian officials started talking about psychotronic weapons a couple of weeks ago. That has brought the subject back from the dead like a ... well, you know.
Moscow is planning to set up an advanced military research agency similar to the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov referred to those plans on March 22. Here's what the RIA Novosti news agency quoted him as saying during a meeting with Prime Minister (and President-elect) Vladimir Putin:
"The development of weaponry based on new physics principles — direct-energy weapons, geophysical weapons, wave-energy weapons, genetic weapons, psychotronic weapons, etc. — is part of the state arms procurement program for 2011-2020 ... We will draft the proposals for the next program by December 2012."
Putin, who begins his presidential term next month, pledged during the campaign that he would beef up Russia's military. In February, he laid out his national security plan in an article published by Rossiiskaya Gazeta. At the time, most of the news reports picked up on Putin's call for almost $770 billion in spending over the course of a decade to modernize the armed forces. But Putin also observed that the current balance of power, held in place by nuclear arsenals, could well shift in the future due to new technologies. It was in that context that he brought up the psychotronic angle:
"The military capability of a country in space or information countermeasures, especially in cyberspace, will play a great, if not decisive, role in determining the nature of an armed conflict. In the more distant future, weapons systems based on new principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will, in addition to nuclear weapons, provide entirely new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals. Such high-tech weapons systems will be comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more 'acceptable' in terms of political and military ideology. In this sense, the strategic balance of nuclear forces will play a gradually diminishing role in deterring aggression and chaos."
In the wake of Serdyukov's comments, folks dredged up Putin's reference to "psychophysical" weapons, added in some background about the research into electromagnetic mind control, and voila: the zombie ray gun. Last week, Britain's Daily Mail suggested that the guns "could be used against Russia's enemies and, perhaps, its own dissidents by the end of the decade."
The Mail also quoted Anatoly Tsyganov, head of the Military Forecasting Center in Moscow, as saying microwaves could make for "a highly serious weapon":
"When it was used for dispersing a crowd and it was focused on a man, his body temperature went up immediately as if he was thrown into a hot frying pan. Still, we know very little about this weapon and even special forces guys can hardly cope with it."
Based on that comment, Tsyganov was apparently talking about a different kind of non-lethal weapon, an analog to the millimeter-wave "pain ray" that the U.S. military has been working on for years. As we noted a couple of weeks ago, the beam of radiation can be directed at a crowd, producing a severe burning sensation on the skin that forces the target to jump away instinctively.
How fast can mad scientists work?
There are a few problems with the pain-ray technology: It takes hours to build up enough power for the beam generator, and the system reportedly works only in clear atmospheric conditions. Nevertheless, testing of the "Silent Guardian" system is continuing, not only for military applications but also for use against oceangoing pirates and rioting prisoners.
The bottom line is that Russia certainly seems to be on track to set up its own DARPA-like "Department of Mad Scientists," working on heat rays, mind-altering electromagnetic beams and heaven knows what else. But there's nothing in the comments from Putin and Serdyukov to suggest that the Russians are anywhere close to having psychotronic weapons. In fact, Putin makes it sound as if the next frontier in warfare won't be the zombie ray gun but the coordinated cyber-attack. And that's scary enough for me.
A very conventional interpretation from a very mainstream source.... but again, one wonders just why microwaves, on their own, would be considered a "new physical principle". Unless there was something unspoken between the superpowers - "in the ether", shall we say? - back in 1969.
Nate
